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Decision and game theory for security [electronic resource] : 4th International Conference, GameSec 2013, Fort Worth, TX, USA, November 11-12, 2013. Proceedings / Sajal K. Das, Cristina Nita-Rotaru, Murat Kantarcioglu (eds.).
Decision and game theory for security [electronic resource] : 4th International Conference, GameSec 2013, Fort Worth, TX, USA, November 11-12, 2013. Proceedings / Sajal K. Das, Cristina Nita-Rotaru, Murat Kantarcioglu (eds.).
Creatore [GameSec (Conference) (4th : 2013 : Fort Worth, Tex.)]
Estensione 1 online resource (x, 265 pages) : illustrations
Disciplina 005.8
Accesso persona Das, Sajal K., editor of compilation
Nita-Rotaru, Cristina, editor of compilation
Kantarcioglu, Murat, editor of compilation
Genere/Forma Electronic books
ISBN 9783319027869 (electronic bk.)
3319027867 (electronic bk.)
9783319027852
Formato Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione eng
Record Nr. UPENN-9961114723503681
[GameSec (Conference) (4th : 2013 : Fort Worth, Tex.)]  
Materiale a stampa
Lo trovi qui: University of Pennsylvania
Decision and game theory for security : 5th International Conference, GameSec 2014, Los Angeles, CA, USA, November 6-7, 2014. Proceedings / Radha Poovendran, Walid Saad (eds.).
Decision and game theory for security : 5th International Conference, GameSec 2014, Los Angeles, CA, USA, November 6-7, 2014. Proceedings / Radha Poovendran, Walid Saad (eds.).
Creatore [GameSec (Conference) (5th : 2014 : Los Angeles, Calif.)]
Estensione 1 online resource (xii, 381 pages) : illustrations.
Disciplina 005.8
Accesso persona Poovendran, Radha, editor
Saad, Walid, editor
Genere/Forma Electronic books
Conference papers and proceedings
ISBN 9783319126012
3319126016
3319126008
9783319126005
Formato Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione eng
Nota di contenuto Intro; Preface; Organization; Table of Contents; Full Papers; Defending Against Opportunistic Criminals: New Game-Theoretic Frameworks and Algorithms; 1 Introduction; 2 Related Work; 3 OSG Framework; 3.1 Modeling Defenders; 3.2 Modeling Opportunistic Criminals; 4 Exact OSG (EOSG) Algorithm; 5 OSG for Multiple Defenders; 6 The COPS Algorithm; 7 Experimental Results; 8 Summary; References; Addressing Scalability and Robustness in Security Games with Multiple Boundedly Rational Adversaries; 1 Introduction; 2 Related Work; 3 Background; 4 Adversary Uncertainty; 4.1 Bayesian Estimation
4.2 Maximin5 Mixed-Integer Linear Programming; 5.1 Linear Approximation; 5.2 Column Generation; 6 Problem Properties; 6.1 MILP Approximation Error; 6.2 Projection; 6.3 Duality; 7 Evaluation; 7.1 Linear Approximation; 7.2 Adversary Types; 7.3 Approach Comparison; 8 Conclusion; References; Empirical Game-Theoretic Analysis of an Adaptive Cyber-Defense Scenario (Preliminary Report); 1 Introduction; 2 Scenario: General Description and Related Work; 3 Detailed Game Specification; 3.1 States and Actions; 3.2 Observation Model; 3.3 Utility; 4 Heuristic Strategies; 4.1 Attacker Strategies
4.1 Game's First Stage: Investment in the presence of the Mediator5 Conclusion; References; Optimal Contracts for Outsourced Computation; 1 Introduction; 2 Related Work; 3 Problem Definition: General Setup; 4 Contracts for Single Agent; 4.1 Optimum Contract for a Single Agent; 4.2 A Risk-Averse Agent; 4.3 Mitigating Clever Guesses; 4.4 Optimal Choice for the Principal; 4.5 Optimal Contract for a Single Agent: Two-Level Reward; 5 Optimal Contracts for Multiple Agents; 5.1 Optimal Contracts for Two Agents; 5.2 Global Optimality of Two-Agent Contracts; 6 Contract Implementation
6.1 Intermediate Steps and Hash Functions6.2 Enforcing Contract Policies; 7 Conclusion; References; A Supervisory Control Approach to Dynamic Cyber-Security; 1 Introduction; 1.1 Contribution; 1.2 Organization; 2 The Dynamic Defense Model; 3 The Defender's Problem; 3.1 The Defender's Optimization Problem; 3.2 Discussion of Problem (PD); 3.3 Specification of Problem (PD); 4 Dynamic Programming Solution for the Defender's Problem; 4.1 The Dynamic Program; 4.2 Solution of the Dynamic Program; 5 Optimal Defender's Policy; 6 Conclusion and Reflections; References; A Appendix -- UMDES-LIB
4.2 Defender Strategies5 Empirical Game Analysis; 5.1 Simulation Setup and Game Model Generation; 5.2 Game-Theoretic Analysis Process; 5.3 Equilibrium Results and Analysis; 5.4 Periodic Δ Reimage; 5.5 Discussion; 6 Conclusions; References; Strategic Discovery and Sharing of Vulnerabilities in Competitive Environments; 1 Introduction; 2 Model; 3 Analysis of the Game; 3.1 Second Stage: Sharing the Bug Discoveries; 3.2 First Stage: Investment for Bug Discovery; 3.3 The Case of δ τ; 4 Mediation: Encouraging Information Sharing
Record Nr. NYU-006491700
[GameSec (Conference) (5th : 2014 : Los Angeles, Calif.)]  
Materiale a stampa
Lo trovi qui: New York University
Decision and Game Theory for Security : 6th International Conference, GameSec 2015, London, UK, November 4-5, 2015, Proceedings / edited by MHR Khouzani, Emmanouil Panaousis, George Theodorakopoulos
Decision and Game Theory for Security : 6th International Conference, GameSec 2015, London, UK, November 4-5, 2015, Proceedings / edited by MHR Khouzani, Emmanouil Panaousis, George Theodorakopoulos
Creatore [GameSec (Conference) (6th : 2015 : London, England)]
Estensione 1 online resource (x, 371 pages) : color illustrations.
Disciplina 005.7
Accesso persona Khouzani, M. H. R., editor.
Panaousis, Emmanouil, editor
Theodorakopoulos, George, editor
Genere/Forma Electronic books
Conference papers and proceedings
ISBN 9783319255941
3319255940
9783319255934
3319255932
Formato Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione eng
Nota di contenuto Intro; Preface; Organization; Contents; Full Papers; A Game-Theoretic Approach to IP Address Randomization in Decoy-Based Cyber Defense; 1 Introduction; 2 Related Work; 3 Model and Preliminaries; 3.1 Virtual Network Model; 3.2 Adversary Model; 4 Modeling Interaction with Single Decoy; 4.1 Timing-Based Decoy Detection Game; 4.2 Fingerprinting-Based Decoy Detection Game; 5 Characterization of Optimal IP Address Randomization Strategy by Network; 5.1 Game Formulation; 5.2 Optimal Strategy of the System; 5.3 Optimal Strategy of the Adversary; 6 Simulation Study; 7 Conclusion; References
Attack-Aware Cyber Insurance for Risk Sharing in Computer Networks1 Introduction; 1.1 Related Works; 1.2 Organization of the Paper; 2 Game-Theoretic Model for Cyber Insurance; 3 Analysis of the Cyber Insurance Model; 3.1 Separable Utilities; 3.2 Case Study: Cyber Insurance Under Infection Dynamics; 4 Conclusion; References; Beware the Soothsayer: From Attack Prediction Accuracy to Predictive Reliability in Security Games; 1 Introduction; 2 Background: Network Security Games; 3 Related Work; 4 Adversary Behavioral Models; 4.1 The Perfectly Rational Model; 4.2 The Quantal Response Model
4.3 The Subjective Utility Quantal Response Model4.4 The SUQR Graph-Aware Model; 5 Defender Strategy Generation; 6 Human Subject Experiments; 6.1 Experimental Overview; 6.2 Experiment Data Composition; 6.3 Data Analysis Metrics; 7 Predictive Reliability Analysis; 7.1 SSG Experiment; 7.2 SSG Predictive Reliability; 7.3 NSG Predictive Reliability; 7.4 Training Set Size; 8 Predictive Reliability Factors; 8.1 Training Set Feature: EAS; 9 Graph Features and Their Impacts on Predictive Reliability; 10 Conclusion; References; Games of Timing for Security in Dynamic Environments; 1 Introduction
2 Related Work2.1 Security Economics and Games of Timing; 2.2 Theoretical Analyses of FlipIt; 2.3 Behavioral Studies of FlipIt; 3 Model; 3.1 Players and Choices; 3.2 Environment; 3.3 Consequences; 4 Analysis; 5 Numerical Examples; 6 Conclusion; References; Threshold FlipThem: When the Winner Does Not Need to Take All; 1 Introduction; 1.1 Prior Work; 2 The Multi-party FlipIt Model; 3 Obtaining Nash Equilibria in Continuous Time for a Stochastic Process; 3.1 Simple Example, FlipThem0F(n,n,d,): Full Threshold, Full Reset; 3.2 FlipThemF(n,t,d,): (n,t)-Threshold, Full Reset
3.3 FlipThemS(n,t,d,): (n,t)-Threshold, Single ResetReferences; A Game Theoretic Model for Defending Against Stealthy Attacks with Limited Resources; 1 Introduction; 2 Game Model; 2.1 Basic Model; 2.2 Defender's Problem; 2.3 Attacker's Problem; 3 Best Responses; 3.1 Defender's Best Response; 3.2 Attacker's Best Response; 3.3 Simplified Optimization Problems; 4 Nash Equilibria; 5 Sequential Game; 6 Numerical Result; 7 Conclusion; References; Passivity-Based Distributed Strategies for Stochastic Stackelberg Security Games; 1 Introduction; 2 Related Work; 3 Model and Game Formulation
Record Nr. NYU-006474042
[GameSec (Conference) (6th : 2015 : London, England)]  
Materiale a stampa
Lo trovi qui: New York University
Decision and game theory for security : first international conference, GameSec 2010, Berlin, Germany, November 22-23, 2010 : proceedings / Tansu Alpcan, Levente Buttyán, John S. Baras (eds.).
Decision and game theory for security : first international conference, GameSec 2010, Berlin, Germany, November 22-23, 2010 : proceedings / Tansu Alpcan, Levente Buttyán, John S. Baras (eds.).
Creatore [GameSec (Conference) (2010 : Berlin, Germany)]
Estensione 1 online resource (xii, 265 pages) : illustrations.
Disciplina 005.8
Accesso persona Alpcan, Tansu, 1975-
Buttyán, Levente
Baras, John S.
ISBN 9783642171970
3642171974
9783642171963
3642171966
Classificazione 53.72
54.32
Formato Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione eng
Record Nr. UALBERTA-7960797
[GameSec (Conference) (2010 : Berlin, Germany)]  
Materiale a stampa
Lo trovi qui: University of Alberta / NEOS Library Consortium
Decision and Game Theory for Security : 6th International Conference, GameSec 2015, London, UK, November 4-5, 2015, Proceedings / edited by MHR Khouzani, Emmanouil Panaousis, George Theodorakopoulos
Decision and Game Theory for Security : 6th International Conference, GameSec 2015, London, UK, November 4-5, 2015, Proceedings / edited by MHR Khouzani, Emmanouil Panaousis, George Theodorakopoulos
Creatore [GameSec (Conference) (6th : 2015 : London, England)]
Estensione 1 online resource (x, 371 pages) : color illustrations.
Disciplina 005.7
Accesso persona Khouzani, M. H. R., editor
Panaousis, Emmanouil, editor
Theodorakopoulos, George, editor
ISBN 9783319255941
3319255940
9783319255934
3319255932
Formato Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione eng
Nota di contenuto Intro; Preface; Organization; Contents; Full Papers; A Game-Theoretic Approach to IP Address Randomization in Decoy-Based Cyber Defense; 1 Introduction; 2 Related Work; 3 Model and Preliminaries; 3.1 Virtual Network Model; 3.2 Adversary Model; 4 Modeling Interaction with Single Decoy; 4.1 Timing-Based Decoy Detection Game; 4.2 Fingerprinting-Based Decoy Detection Game; 5 Characterization of Optimal IP Address Randomization Strategy by Network; 5.1 Game Formulation; 5.2 Optimal Strategy of the System; 5.3 Optimal Strategy of the Adversary; 6 Simulation Study; 7 Conclusion; References
Attack-Aware Cyber Insurance for Risk Sharing in Computer Networks1 Introduction; 1.1 Related Works; 1.2 Organization of the Paper; 2 Game-Theoretic Model for Cyber Insurance; 3 Analysis of the Cyber Insurance Model; 3.1 Separable Utilities; 3.2 Case Study: Cyber Insurance Under Infection Dynamics; 4 Conclusion; References; Beware the Soothsayer: From Attack Prediction Accuracy to Predictive Reliability in Security Games; 1 Introduction; 2 Background: Network Security Games; 3 Related Work; 4 Adversary Behavioral Models; 4.1 The Perfectly Rational Model; 4.2 The Quantal Response Model
4.3 The Subjective Utility Quantal Response Model4.4 The SUQR Graph-Aware Model; 5 Defender Strategy Generation; 6 Human Subject Experiments; 6.1 Experimental Overview; 6.2 Experiment Data Composition; 6.3 Data Analysis Metrics; 7 Predictive Reliability Analysis; 7.1 SSG Experiment; 7.2 SSG Predictive Reliability; 7.3 NSG Predictive Reliability; 7.4 Training Set Size; 8 Predictive Reliability Factors; 8.1 Training Set Feature: EAS; 9 Graph Features and Their Impacts on Predictive Reliability; 10 Conclusion; References; Games of Timing for Security in Dynamic Environments; 1 Introduction
2 Related Work2.1 Security Economics and Games of Timing; 2.2 Theoretical Analyses of FlipIt; 2.3 Behavioral Studies of FlipIt; 3 Model; 3.1 Players and Choices; 3.2 Environment; 3.3 Consequences; 4 Analysis; 5 Numerical Examples; 6 Conclusion; References; Threshold FlipThem: When the Winner Does Not Need to Take All; 1 Introduction; 1.1 Prior Work; 2 The Multi-party FlipIt Model; 3 Obtaining Nash Equilibria in Continuous Time for a Stochastic Process; 3.1 Simple Example, FlipThem0F(n, n, d, ): Full Threshold, Full Reset; 3.2 FlipThemF(n, t, d, ): (n, t)-Threshold, Full Reset
3.3 FlipThemS(n, t, d, ): (n, t)-Threshold, Single ResetReferences; A Game Theoretic Model for Defending Against Stealthy Attacks with Limited Resources; 1 Introduction; 2 Game Model; 2.1 Basic Model; 2.2 Defender's Problem; 2.3 Attacker's Problem; 3 Best Responses; 3.1 Defender's Best Response; 3.2 Attacker's Best Response; 3.3 Simplified Optimization Problems; 4 Nash Equilibria; 5 Sequential Game; 6 Numerical Result; 7 Conclusion; References; Passivity-Based Distributed Strategies for Stochastic Stackelberg Security Games; 1 Introduction; 2 Related Work; 3 Model and Game Formulation
Record Nr. STANFORD-a11641288
[GameSec (Conference) (6th : 2015 : London, England)]  
Materiale a stampa
Lo trovi qui: Stanford University
Decision and game theory for security [electronic resource] : third international conference, GameSec 2012, Budapest, Hungary, November 5-6, 2012 : proceedings / Jens Grossklags, Jean Walrand (eds.).
Decision and game theory for security [electronic resource] : third international conference, GameSec 2012, Budapest, Hungary, November 5-6, 2012 : proceedings / Jens Grossklags, Jean Walrand (eds.).
Creatore [GameSec (Conference) (3rd : 2012 : Budapest, Hungary)]
Estensione 1 online resource (xii, 308 p.)
Disciplina 005.8
Accesso persona Grossklags, Jens
Walrand, Jean
ISBN 3642342663 (electronic bk.)
9783642342660 (electronic bk.)
9783642342653
3642342655
Formato Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione eng
Record Nr. STANFORD-a9858079
[GameSec (Conference) (3rd : 2012 : Budapest, Hungary)]  
Materiale a stampa
Lo trovi qui: Stanford University
Decision and game theory for security : 4th International Conference, GameSec 2013, Fort Worth, TX, USA, November 11-12, 2013. Proceedings / Sajal K. Das, Cristina Nita-Rotaru, Murat Kantarcioglu (eds.).
Decision and game theory for security : 4th International Conference, GameSec 2013, Fort Worth, TX, USA, November 11-12, 2013. Proceedings / Sajal K. Das, Cristina Nita-Rotaru, Murat Kantarcioglu (eds.).
Creatore [GameSec (Conference) (4th : 2013 : Fort Worth, Tex.)]
Estensione 1 online resource (x, 265 pages) : illustrations.
Disciplina 005.8
Accesso persona Das, Sajal K., editor
Nita-Rotaru, Cristina, editor
Kantarcioglu, Murat, editor
ISBN 9783319027869
3319027867
3319027859
9783319027852
Formato Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione eng
Record Nr. STANFORD-a10345196
[GameSec (Conference) (4th : 2013 : Fort Worth, Tex.)]  
Materiale a stampa
Lo trovi qui: Stanford University
Decision and Game Theory for Security : 6th International Conference, GameSec 2015, London, UK, November 4-5, 2015, Proceedings / edited by MHR Khouzani, Emmanouil Panaousis, George Theodorakopoulos
Decision and Game Theory for Security : 6th International Conference, GameSec 2015, London, UK, November 4-5, 2015, Proceedings / edited by MHR Khouzani, Emmanouil Panaousis, George Theodorakopoulos
Creatore [GameSec (Conference) (6th : 2015 : London, England)]
Estensione 1 online resource (x, 371 pages) : color illustrations.
Accesso persona Khouzani, M. H. R., editor.
Panaousis, Emmanouil, editor
Theodorakopoulos, George, editor
Genere/Forma Conference papers and proceedings
ISBN 9783319255941
3319255940
9783319255934
3319255932
Formato Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione eng
Record Nr. UCHICAGO-11097003
[GameSec (Conference) (6th : 2015 : London, England)]  
Materiale a stampa
Lo trovi qui: University of Chicago
Decision and game theory for security : 10th International Conference, GameSec 2019, Stockholm, Sweden, October 30-November 1, 2019, Proceedings / Tansu Alpcan, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik, John S. Baras, György Dán (eds.).
Decision and game theory for security : 10th International Conference, GameSec 2019, Stockholm, Sweden, October 30-November 1, 2019, Proceedings / Tansu Alpcan, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik, John S. Baras, György Dán (eds.).
Creatore [GameSec (Conference) (10th : 2019 : Stockholm, Sweden)]
Estensione 1 online resource (xi, 584 pages) : illustrations (some color).
Disciplina 005.8
Accesso persona Alpcan, Tansu, 1975- editor
Vorobeychik, Yevgeniy, editor
Baras, John S., editor
Dán, György, editor
ISBN 9783030324308
3030324303
9783030324292
Formato Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione eng
Nota di contenuto Game theory, control, and mechanism design for security and privacy -- Decision making for cybersecurity and security requirements engineering -- Security and privacy for the Internet-of-Things, cyber-physical systems, cloud computing, resilient control systems, and critical infrastructure -- Pricing, economic incentives, security investments, and cyber insurance for dependable and secure systems -- Risk assessment and security risk management -- Security and privacy of wireless and mobile communications, including user location privacy -- Socio-technological and behavioral approaches to security -- Empirical and experimental studies with game, control, or optimization theory-based analysis for security and privacy -- Adversarial Machine Learning and the role of AI in system security.
Record Nr. STANFORD-a13424918
[GameSec (Conference) (10th : 2019 : Stockholm, Sweden)]  
Materiale a stampa
Lo trovi qui: Stanford University
Decision and game theory for security : first international conference, GameSec 2010, Berlin, Germany, November 22-23, 2010 : proceedings / Tansu Alpcan, Levente Buttyán, John S. Baras (eds.).
Decision and game theory for security : first international conference, GameSec 2010, Berlin, Germany, November 22-23, 2010 : proceedings / Tansu Alpcan, Levente Buttyán, John S. Baras (eds.).
Creatore [GameSec (Conference) (2010 : Berlin, Germany)]
Estensione 1 online resource (xii, 265 pages) : illustrations.
Disciplina 005.8
Accesso persona Alpcan, Tansu, 1975-
Buttyán, Levente
Baras, John S.
Genere/Forma Electronic books
Conference papers and proceedings
ISBN 9783642171970
3642171974
9783642171963
3642171966
Classificazione 53.72
54.32
Formato Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione eng
Nota di contenuto Security Investments and Planning -- Design of Network Topology in an Adversarial Environment -- Optimal Information Security Investment with Penetration Testing -- Privacy and Anonymity -- Tracking Games in Mobile Networks -- gPath: A Game-Theoretic Path Selection Algorithm to Protect Tor’s Anonymity -- When Do Firms Invest in Privacy-Preserving Technologies? -- Adversarial and Robust Control -- Adversarial Control in a Delay Tolerant Network -- Security Interdependencies for Networked Control Systems with Identical Agents -- Robust Control in Sparse Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks -- Network Security and Botnets -- A Game-Theoretical Approach for Finding Optimal Strategies in a Botnet Defense Model -- ISPs and Ad Networks Against Botnet Ad Fraud -- A Localization Game in Wireless Sensor Networks -- Effective Multimodel Anomaly Detection Using Cooperative Negotiation -- Authorization and Authentication -- The Password Game: Negative Externalities from Weak Password Practices -- Towards a Game Theoretic Authorisation Model -- Theory and Algorithms for Security -- Disperse or Unite? A Mathematical Model of Coordinated Attack -- Uncertainty in Interdependent Security Games -- Attack–Defense Trees and Two-Player Binary Zero-Sum Extensive Form Games Are Equivalent -- Methods and Algorithms for Infinite Bayesian Stackelberg Security Games.
Record Nr. NYU-004619157
[GameSec (Conference) (2010 : Berlin, Germany)]  
Materiale a stampa
Lo trovi qui: New York University