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Decision and Game Theory for Security : 6th International Conference, GameSec 2015, London, UK, November 4-5, 2015, Proceedings / edited by MHR Khouzani, Emmanouil Panaousis, George Theodorakopoulos
Decision and Game Theory for Security : 6th International Conference, GameSec 2015, London, UK, November 4-5, 2015, Proceedings / edited by MHR Khouzani, Emmanouil Panaousis, George Theodorakopoulos
Creatore [GameSec (Conference) (6th : 2015 : London, England)]
Estensione 1 online resource (x, 371 pages) : color illustrations.
Disciplina 005.7
Accesso persona Khouzani, M. H. R., editor.
Panaousis, Emmanouil, editor
Theodorakopoulos, George, editor
Genere/Forma Electronic books
Conference papers and proceedings
ISBN 9783319255941
3319255940
9783319255934
3319255932
Formato Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione eng
Nota di contenuto Intro; Preface; Organization; Contents; Full Papers; A Game-Theoretic Approach to IP Address Randomization in Decoy-Based Cyber Defense; 1 Introduction; 2 Related Work; 3 Model and Preliminaries; 3.1 Virtual Network Model; 3.2 Adversary Model; 4 Modeling Interaction with Single Decoy; 4.1 Timing-Based Decoy Detection Game; 4.2 Fingerprinting-Based Decoy Detection Game; 5 Characterization of Optimal IP Address Randomization Strategy by Network; 5.1 Game Formulation; 5.2 Optimal Strategy of the System; 5.3 Optimal Strategy of the Adversary; 6 Simulation Study; 7 Conclusion; References
Attack-Aware Cyber Insurance for Risk Sharing in Computer Networks1 Introduction; 1.1 Related Works; 1.2 Organization of the Paper; 2 Game-Theoretic Model for Cyber Insurance; 3 Analysis of the Cyber Insurance Model; 3.1 Separable Utilities; 3.2 Case Study: Cyber Insurance Under Infection Dynamics; 4 Conclusion; References; Beware the Soothsayer: From Attack Prediction Accuracy to Predictive Reliability in Security Games; 1 Introduction; 2 Background: Network Security Games; 3 Related Work; 4 Adversary Behavioral Models; 4.1 The Perfectly Rational Model; 4.2 The Quantal Response Model
4.3 The Subjective Utility Quantal Response Model4.4 The SUQR Graph-Aware Model; 5 Defender Strategy Generation; 6 Human Subject Experiments; 6.1 Experimental Overview; 6.2 Experiment Data Composition; 6.3 Data Analysis Metrics; 7 Predictive Reliability Analysis; 7.1 SSG Experiment; 7.2 SSG Predictive Reliability; 7.3 NSG Predictive Reliability; 7.4 Training Set Size; 8 Predictive Reliability Factors; 8.1 Training Set Feature: EAS; 9 Graph Features and Their Impacts on Predictive Reliability; 10 Conclusion; References; Games of Timing for Security in Dynamic Environments; 1 Introduction
2 Related Work2.1 Security Economics and Games of Timing; 2.2 Theoretical Analyses of FlipIt; 2.3 Behavioral Studies of FlipIt; 3 Model; 3.1 Players and Choices; 3.2 Environment; 3.3 Consequences; 4 Analysis; 5 Numerical Examples; 6 Conclusion; References; Threshold FlipThem: When the Winner Does Not Need to Take All; 1 Introduction; 1.1 Prior Work; 2 The Multi-party FlipIt Model; 3 Obtaining Nash Equilibria in Continuous Time for a Stochastic Process; 3.1 Simple Example, FlipThem0F(n,n,d,): Full Threshold, Full Reset; 3.2 FlipThemF(n,t,d,): (n,t)-Threshold, Full Reset
3.3 FlipThemS(n,t,d,): (n,t)-Threshold, Single ResetReferences; A Game Theoretic Model for Defending Against Stealthy Attacks with Limited Resources; 1 Introduction; 2 Game Model; 2.1 Basic Model; 2.2 Defender's Problem; 2.3 Attacker's Problem; 3 Best Responses; 3.1 Defender's Best Response; 3.2 Attacker's Best Response; 3.3 Simplified Optimization Problems; 4 Nash Equilibria; 5 Sequential Game; 6 Numerical Result; 7 Conclusion; References; Passivity-Based Distributed Strategies for Stochastic Stackelberg Security Games; 1 Introduction; 2 Related Work; 3 Model and Game Formulation
Record Nr. NYU-006474042
[GameSec (Conference) (6th : 2015 : London, England)]  
Materiale a stampa
Lo trovi qui: New York University
Decision and Game Theory for Security : 6th International Conference, GameSec 2015, London, UK, November 4-5, 2015, Proceedings / edited by MHR Khouzani, Emmanouil Panaousis, George Theodorakopoulos
Decision and Game Theory for Security : 6th International Conference, GameSec 2015, London, UK, November 4-5, 2015, Proceedings / edited by MHR Khouzani, Emmanouil Panaousis, George Theodorakopoulos
Creatore [GameSec (Conference) (6th : 2015 : London, England)]
Estensione 1 online resource (x, 371 pages) : color illustrations.
Disciplina 005.7
Accesso persona Khouzani, M. H. R., editor
Panaousis, Emmanouil, editor
Theodorakopoulos, George, editor
ISBN 9783319255941
3319255940
9783319255934
3319255932
Formato Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione eng
Nota di contenuto Intro; Preface; Organization; Contents; Full Papers; A Game-Theoretic Approach to IP Address Randomization in Decoy-Based Cyber Defense; 1 Introduction; 2 Related Work; 3 Model and Preliminaries; 3.1 Virtual Network Model; 3.2 Adversary Model; 4 Modeling Interaction with Single Decoy; 4.1 Timing-Based Decoy Detection Game; 4.2 Fingerprinting-Based Decoy Detection Game; 5 Characterization of Optimal IP Address Randomization Strategy by Network; 5.1 Game Formulation; 5.2 Optimal Strategy of the System; 5.3 Optimal Strategy of the Adversary; 6 Simulation Study; 7 Conclusion; References
Attack-Aware Cyber Insurance for Risk Sharing in Computer Networks1 Introduction; 1.1 Related Works; 1.2 Organization of the Paper; 2 Game-Theoretic Model for Cyber Insurance; 3 Analysis of the Cyber Insurance Model; 3.1 Separable Utilities; 3.2 Case Study: Cyber Insurance Under Infection Dynamics; 4 Conclusion; References; Beware the Soothsayer: From Attack Prediction Accuracy to Predictive Reliability in Security Games; 1 Introduction; 2 Background: Network Security Games; 3 Related Work; 4 Adversary Behavioral Models; 4.1 The Perfectly Rational Model; 4.2 The Quantal Response Model
4.3 The Subjective Utility Quantal Response Model4.4 The SUQR Graph-Aware Model; 5 Defender Strategy Generation; 6 Human Subject Experiments; 6.1 Experimental Overview; 6.2 Experiment Data Composition; 6.3 Data Analysis Metrics; 7 Predictive Reliability Analysis; 7.1 SSG Experiment; 7.2 SSG Predictive Reliability; 7.3 NSG Predictive Reliability; 7.4 Training Set Size; 8 Predictive Reliability Factors; 8.1 Training Set Feature: EAS; 9 Graph Features and Their Impacts on Predictive Reliability; 10 Conclusion; References; Games of Timing for Security in Dynamic Environments; 1 Introduction
2 Related Work2.1 Security Economics and Games of Timing; 2.2 Theoretical Analyses of FlipIt; 2.3 Behavioral Studies of FlipIt; 3 Model; 3.1 Players and Choices; 3.2 Environment; 3.3 Consequences; 4 Analysis; 5 Numerical Examples; 6 Conclusion; References; Threshold FlipThem: When the Winner Does Not Need to Take All; 1 Introduction; 1.1 Prior Work; 2 The Multi-party FlipIt Model; 3 Obtaining Nash Equilibria in Continuous Time for a Stochastic Process; 3.1 Simple Example, FlipThem0F(n, n, d, ): Full Threshold, Full Reset; 3.2 FlipThemF(n, t, d, ): (n, t)-Threshold, Full Reset
3.3 FlipThemS(n, t, d, ): (n, t)-Threshold, Single ResetReferences; A Game Theoretic Model for Defending Against Stealthy Attacks with Limited Resources; 1 Introduction; 2 Game Model; 2.1 Basic Model; 2.2 Defender's Problem; 2.3 Attacker's Problem; 3 Best Responses; 3.1 Defender's Best Response; 3.2 Attacker's Best Response; 3.3 Simplified Optimization Problems; 4 Nash Equilibria; 5 Sequential Game; 6 Numerical Result; 7 Conclusion; References; Passivity-Based Distributed Strategies for Stochastic Stackelberg Security Games; 1 Introduction; 2 Related Work; 3 Model and Game Formulation
Record Nr. STANFORD-a11641288
[GameSec (Conference) (6th : 2015 : London, England)]  
Materiale a stampa
Lo trovi qui: Stanford University
Decision and Game Theory for Security : 6th International Conference, GameSec 2015, London, UK, November 4-5, 2015, Proceedings / edited by MHR Khouzani, Emmanouil Panaousis, George Theodorakopoulos
Decision and Game Theory for Security : 6th International Conference, GameSec 2015, London, UK, November 4-5, 2015, Proceedings / edited by MHR Khouzani, Emmanouil Panaousis, George Theodorakopoulos
Creatore [GameSec (Conference) (6th : 2015 : London, England)]
Estensione 1 online resource (x, 371 pages) : color illustrations.
Accesso persona Khouzani, M. H. R., editor.
Panaousis, Emmanouil, editor
Theodorakopoulos, George, editor
Genere/Forma Conference papers and proceedings
ISBN 9783319255941
3319255940
9783319255934
3319255932
Formato Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione eng
Record Nr. UCHICAGO-11097003
[GameSec (Conference) (6th : 2015 : London, England)]  
Materiale a stampa
Lo trovi qui: University of Chicago