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Decision and game theory for security : third international conference, GameSec 2012, Budapest, Hungary, November 5-6, 2012 : proceedings / Jens Grossklags, Jean Walrand (eds.).
Decision and game theory for security : third international conference, GameSec 2012, Budapest, Hungary, November 5-6, 2012 : proceedings / Jens Grossklags, Jean Walrand (eds.).
Creatore [GameSec (Conference) (3rd : 2012 : Budapest, Hungary)]
Estensione 1 online resource (xii, 308 p.) : ill.
Disciplina 005.8
Accesso persona Grossklags, Jens
Walrand, Jean
Genere/Forma Electronic books
ISBN 9783642342653
3642342655
Formato Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione eng
Record Nr. DUKE-005784134
[GameSec (Conference) (3rd : 2012 : Budapest, Hungary)]  
Materiale a stampa
Lo trovi qui: Duke University
Decision and game theory for security : third international conference, GameSec 2012, Budapest, Hungary, November 5-6, 2012 : proceedings / Jens Grossklags, Jean Walrand (eds.).
Decision and game theory for security : third international conference, GameSec 2012, Budapest, Hungary, November 5-6, 2012 : proceedings / Jens Grossklags, Jean Walrand (eds.).
Creatore [GameSec (Conference) (3rd : 2012 : Budapest, Hungary)]
Estensione 1 online resource (xii, 308 pages).
Disciplina 005.8
Accesso persona Grossklags, Jens
Walrand, Jean
Genere/Forma Conference papers and proceedings
ISBN 3642342663
9783642342660
3642342655
9783642342653
Formato Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione eng
Nota di contenuto Intro; Title; Preface; Organization; Table of Contents; Secret Communications; Where to Hide the Bits?; Introduction; Problem Definition; Solving the Model; Preliminaries; Game Outcome; Nash Equilibria; Discussion; Numerical Examples; Adequacy of Eve's Constraints; Alternative Interpretation; Relation to Adversarial Classification; Concluding Remarks; References; Socio-Rational Secret Sharing as a New Direction in Rational Cryptography; Introduction; Our Solution in Nutshell; Our Motivation; Our Contribution; Preliminaries; Game-Theoretic Concepts; Rational Secret Sharing.
Social Secret SharingLiterature Review; Socio-Rational Secret Sharing; Utility Assumption; Utility Computation; Proposed Protocol; Expected Utility; Comparison with Existing Techniques; Conclusion and Future Direction; References; Identification of Attackers; Audit Mechanisms for Provable Risk Management and Accountable Data Governance; Introduction; Overview; Audit Game Model; Auditing Strategy; Equilibrium Concepts; Equilibrium in the Audit Game; Comparision with Other Equilibria; Budget Allocation; Optimized Budget Allocation; Towards Accountable Data Governance.
Predictions and InterventionsRelated Work; Conclusion and Future Work; References; A Game Theoretical Analysis of Lemonizing Cybercriminal Black Markets; Introduction; Summary of Main Results and Contribution of This Study; The Model; Background Information; Cost Function of Sellers; Utility Function of Consumers; Demand Function of Consumers; Analyses of Various Scenarios; The Basic Case I: Perfect Signaling (i.e., =1), No Government Participation and Arrest (i.e., 1=2=0), and Quadratic Utility Function of Consumers.
The Basic Case II: Perfect Signaling (i.e., =1), No Government Participation and Arrest (i.e., 1=2=0), and Linear Utility Function of Consumers (i.e., =0)Government Joining the Peach Group, Imperfect Signaling of Quality (i.e., 020); Discussion; Conclusion; References; Computing the Nash Equilibria of Intruder Classification Games; Introduction; Related Work; Summary of Contributions; Game Model; Spy's Cost Function.
Defender's Payoff FunctionPlayers' Interactions; Game-Theoretic Analysis; Best Response Analysis; Form of Players' Strategies in NE; Evaluation with Model Examples; Example Model 1; Example Model 2; Parameter Effects in the Game; Effect of the Probability of the Spy p and False Alarm Cost cfa; Effect of the Detection Cost cd, the Classification Window N and Single FS Attack Cost ca; Effect of the Spammer's Distribution Parameter 0; Conclusion; References; Multi-step Attacks; Upper Bounds for Adversaries' Utility in Attack Trees; Introduction; State of the Art, Motivation and Results.
Record Nr. NYU-006481944
[GameSec (Conference) (3rd : 2012 : Budapest, Hungary)]  
Materiale a stampa
Lo trovi qui: New York University